Quantum Readiness Scan

qrp-mcp

Every signature in your wallet, contract and validator rests on elliptic-curve cryptography. A large quantum computer breaks it. This tells your AI agent exactly where yours is.

An MCP server that scans a local directory for cryptography that Shor's algorithm defeats — secp256k1, Ed25519, BLS, Schnorr, RSA — plus weak primitives and CI signing commands, and classifies each one: broken by a quantum computer, post-quantum, or neither.

Everything runs on your machine. No network calls, no account, no API key, nothing uploaded. A tool that reads your keys' surroundings has no business phoning home, so this one makes zero outbound connections — enforced by a test, not promised in a paragraph.

Why this matters for chains and wallets

Bitcoin and Ethereum authenticate with ECDSA over secp256k1. Solana, Cardano and Polkadot use Ed25519. Ethereum's consensus layer aggregates with BLS12-381. Taproot adds Schnorr.

All four are public-key schemes whose security rests on discrete-log hardness — and all four fall to the same quantum algorithm. The practical consequence is specific: once a public key is exposed, the private key becomes derivable. Reused addresses, on-chain public keys, and long-lived validator keys are where that exposure already exists today.

None of this is a prediction about dates. It is an inventory question: which of my code paths sign with what? That question has an answer right now, and this tool gives it.

Quick start

Add it to your MCP client — no installation step, uvx fetches and runs it:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "qrp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["qrp-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Then ask your agent:

Scan ~/code/my-protocol for quantum-vulnerable cryptography.

As a Claude Code plugin

The same server, packaged with a skill, so there is no config file to edit:

/plugin marketplace add StanimirTenev/qrp-mcp
/plugin install qrp@quantumreadiness

Then /qrp:pqc-scan in any project. Both routes need uv on your PATH, since uvx is what fetches and runs the server.

Tools

Tool	What it does
scan_repo(path)	Scans a directory's source, CI/CD configs and infrastructure-as-code; returns findings, a summary, and the coverage block below
export_cbom(path)	The same reading as a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM, with the coverage block inside it
compare_coverage(a, b)	Whether two scans produced numbers that can be compared at all
list_algorithms()	The algorithm families the server recognises and how each is classified

What it looks at

Chain and wallet code — secp256k1, ecrecover, ethers, web3, bitcoinjs, ECPair, btcec, tweetnacl, @solana/web3.js, solana_program, bls12-381, blst, @chainsafe/bls, BIP340/Taproot Schnorr. Solidity (.sol), Rust (.rs), Move and Cairo are scanned alongside Python, Go, Java, JS/TS, Ruby, PHP, C/C++/C# — headers included — PowerShell, Perl and shell.

Classical crypto anywhere else — RSA, DSA, DH, ECDSA and elliptic-curve usage, plus MD5, SHA-1, RC4 and DES/3DES.

Hybrids and composites — the RFC 10024 TLS groups X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024, OpenSSH 10's default mlkem768x25519-sha256, and the composite certificate algorithms of draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs such as id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256. A hybrid holds if either half holds, so the post-quantum scheme leads — and the classical half is carried in also_present rather than dropped, since it is the component Shor breaks.

Post-quantum schemes, by family — ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, Falcon (FN-DSA), NTRU, Classic McEliece, BIKE, HQC, FrodoKEM, XMSS, and the stateful LMS/HSS of SP 800-208 that CNSA 2.0 requires for firmware signing. The nine schemes NIST advanced to its third additional-signatures round in May 2026 — FAEST, HAWK, MAYO, MQOM, QR-UOV, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign, UOV — are recognised as candidates, and CROSS as dropped from that process.

Each carries the mathematical family it rests on (structured or unstructured lattice, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, multivariate, symmetric-based) and where it stands: standardised, selected, candidate, withdrawn, eliminated or broken. SIKE is reported as broken and HAWK as withdrawn rather than counted as quantum-resistant — "post-quantum" is a category, not an assessment.

Certificates and keys — .pem, .der, .crt, .cer, .cert, .csr, .key, .pub, .p12, .pfx. Algorithms are resolved from the object identifiers inside the DER and from PEM labels and OpenSSH key types, and private key material is reported separately. This does not parse X.509: it keeps only the identifiers already in the classifier, so a malformed certificate yields nothing rather than nonsense.

Configuration — nginx.conf, sshd_config, openssl.cnf, swanctl.conf, .ini, .toml, .properties, and any YAML that is not a manifest. This is where a TLS or SSH hybrid group is chosen: X25519MLKEM768 and mlkem768x25519-sha256 are almost never strings in code. IKE proposal syntax is read here too — ecp384 is NIST P-384, modp2048 is group 14.

Quantum-resistant mechanisms, not only algorithms — RFC 8784 mixes a postquantum preshared key into IKEv2 key derivation, so a tunnel resists a quantum adversary with no post-quantum algorithm present. A scanner matching algorithm names cannot see that by construction, and would report a protected deployment as classical_only. PPK is matched by the directives that switch it on and classified as quantum_resistant_mechanism — deliberately not pqc_ready, because a preshared key is not ML-KEM. Whether it holds depends on the entropy of the key and on out-of-band distribution, neither of which is visible in a file, and the finding says so.

CI/CD pipelines — signing commands such as gpg --sign, cosign sign, signtool, jarsigner, codesign.

Infrastructure as code — Terraform and Kubernetes key algorithms, and private key material committed by mistake.

Real run against OpenZeppelin's contracts (711 files, about five seconds):

{
  "detected_algorithms": ["ECDSA", "RSA"],
  "summary": {
    "quantum_vulnerable_count": 2,
    "pqc_ready_count": 0,
    "highest_severity": "high",
    "pqc_readiness": "classical_only"
  }
}

What the coverage block says

Every scan carries one, because a coverage figure without its conditions is not comparable to another coverage figure. Four things, each answering something the percentage cannot:

• instrument — the version and the emitter's own commit. Two runs of this package once reported the same version from code that differed by a commit, so the version alone does not identify what did the reading. Where the tool runs from an installed wheel there is no commit, and the field says which absence rather than going quiet.
• corpus — the commit that was read, whether the tree was dirty, and whether the clone was shallow. A commit identifies a tracked tree; a scanner walks a filesystem, and the two are not the same thing.
• window — when it was read.
• scope — the denominator, the numerator, and every file that was in the first and not the second, with a reason. The reasons are a closed set: type_not_claimed is a boundary this tool declares, unreadable is a failure it hit, and they are never collapsed. A reason with no instances is reported at zero rather than omitted.

It also states which kind of claim the numbers are. Coverage is a claim about reading, not about finding: a file can be opened, counted, and still be one this tool was blind in. Reaching a file is something a scanner can measure about itself; whether it found what was there is not, because a silent rule and an absent algorithm produce the same output. So the block reports claims.axis: reached, and declares that it holds no control — the corpus with independently established contents that would license the second claim — naming the absence rather than implying the stronger reading.

What the number is, and what it is not

A coverage figure here is the overlap between the file types this tool claims and what the corpus is made of. It is not a discovery rate. A scanner claiming 32 extensions cannot reach 100 % against a tree holding 79 kinds, so a lower number means more file types left unclaimed rather than more cryptography left unfound — and the two read identically unless the page says which it is.

The denominator stays conservative anyway: you cannot know a .txt holds no PEM block without opening it, and key files often carry no extension at all.

Concentration, and the partition it is measured over

The block reports where the mass sits, not only how large a total is — because an aggregate over a lopsided population describes its largest members and reads as describing all of them. Measured across five open-source repositories: three file kinds account for 52 % to 89 % of everything not read, and the two largest kinds present are 43 % to 55 % of everything counted.

Three values travel with every share, and the third is the one most tools omit:

• share — how much the largest members are.
• cardinality — how many kinds that share is out of. Three of 24 kinds at 69 % is five and a half times a flat split; three of 63 at 68 % is fourteen times one. Without it the same share means different things and cannot be read as high or low at all.
• partition — what a kind is. A concentration is not a property of an aggregate but of the aggregate crossed with the partition it was measured over: the same tree split by extension, by directory, or by language gives different shares with nothing changing on disk. This block partitions by file extension and says so beside every figure.

The signer's sentence carries the same three inside the bracket holding the count, because a figure lifted out of a document without them is the failure the block exists to prevent:

This scan read 822 of 1250 files (65.76%); the remaining 428 (3 of 24, by extension —
files with no extension, .rst and .txt — being 68.93% of them) are listed with a reason each.

The published measurement, with the raw artefacts: quantumreadiness.eu/evidence/scan-coverage

The CBOM it emits

export_cbom produces a CycloneDX 1.6 document, validated against the published schema. Three things travel in it that a component list alone cannot say:

• compositions.aggregate — complete only where every file present was examined, incomplete otherwise, and unknown where the tool cannot account for its own reading.
• properties — the whole coverage block. It travels there because the root object is additionalProperties: false and the format has no field for it; the awkwardness is the point rather than something to hide.
• evidence.occurrences — file, line and matched text for every asset.

Output is deterministic: the timestamp comes from the scan window and the serial number from the target and the two pins, so the same code over the same corpus produces the same document and different code does not.

Why deterministic

There is no LLM inside this tool. The same input always produces the same output, and every finding points at a file and a line you can open yourself.

That is the point of handing it to an agent: the agent brings the language, the tool brings the truth. An agent guessing about your signing code is worse than nothing; an agent reading a deterministic inventory can actually reason about it.

What it is not

It reads source, configuration, CI pipelines, infrastructure-as-code and Kubernetes manifests. It does not read documentation, binaries or images.

Every file under the path is accounted for in one of three ways: scanned, unreadable, or skipped because the tool does not claim that type — the last counted by extension, so the coverage figure has a base. files_scanned + unreadable_files + files_skipped_by_type always equals files_present. A scan that read seven files out of nine is a different report from one that read seven out of four hundred, and only one of them is worth trusting.

A free inventory tool, not a readiness assessment. It deliberately does not do:

• risk scoring or prioritisation,
• migration planning,
• network or host scanning, or reading a system certificate store,
• tracking change over time.

Those live in the Quantum Readiness Platform, the product this tool is extracted from. Nothing here is crippled to push you there — what it does, it does completely.

It also does not tell you that you are about to be hacked. It tells you what you are using.

License

Apache-2.0.